Extreme vulnerability in Europe
Already on 11 December 2019 the European
Commission presented The European Green Deal, an ambitious programme to turn
Europe in 2050 into the first completely climatological neutral continent in
the world, with an important focus on energy independence and
reindustrialization (https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en).
Very soon after three events would rocket the
whole world causing social, political and financial turmoil of biblical
proportions: the covid pandemic, the war in Ukraine and recently the Israeli
invasion in Gaza. The first mentioned would disrupt, though only temporarily,
the supply chain for industrial goods from China. The second one would cut off permanently
the supply of natural gas from Russia. Natural gas is an essential fuel for
Europe without which their economies may come to a complete stand still. The
last one in the series may cause severe problems with the supply of crude oil
if the countries on the Persian Gulf get involved in the conflict. Also the
supply of industrial goods from China may get disrupted again if finally ship
transit through the Red Sea is blocked.
In the light of these events it is logical that
the European Commission decided to accelerate and intensify the European Green
Deal. In May 2022 REPowerEU (https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/repowereu-affordable-secure-and-sustainable-energy-europe_en) was launched, a plan provided with
funding to save energy, generate
renewable energy and diversify the sources of our energy. In February 2023 the Green
Deal Industrial Plan was launched (https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/green-deal-industrial-plan_en), also well provided with European
funding (InvestEU, https://investeu.europa.eu/index_en), with the purpose to
reindustrialize the whole of Europe, focusing on key industries to achieve
complete energy independence as well as climatological neutrality.
Perspectives for new industrial
projects
It is not a surprise that the diligence
displayed by the European Commission has motivated many investors and business
people to initiate industrial projects to be carried out in Europe, especially
related to the energy transition: solar photovoltaic cells and modules,
batteries of all types, electrolizers for hydrogen production, polysilicon
wafers for microchips, solar cells, electromagnetic components and a lot more. To
limit myself to my core business, which is the development of solar energy
projects, as an economist I can confirm that each and every project developed
and launched thus far could be perfectly profitable if the prices paid for
energy and industrial goods stayed at the levels of 2022 when the solar
photovoltaic module price increased to 0.40 €/Wp, after a long period of
constant decreases until 2020 when it fell to only 0.17 €/Wp (https://www.pvxchange.com/Price-Index).
However, in 2023 the photovoltaic module price
initiated a spectacular fall again to hardly 0.15 €/Wp, basically due to two
factors: the measures taken in the United States against industrial products
from China, accused of dumping, and the overproduction in that country causing
an excess supply in Europe.
There is now an increasing number of analyses
and studies that forecast even more spectacular photovoltaic module price falls
as from now, leaving it at no more than 0.09 €/Wp in 2030 (https://rethinkresearch.biz/articles/rethink-energys-solar-module-price-forecast-to-2040/). I must admit however that the
technological progress expected especially in manufacturing processes for sure
will contribute to mentioned price falls. Such technological progress includes,
but is not limited to the application of hetero instead of homo junction in
photovoltaic cell manufacturing (nothing to do with couple formation between
human beings), the application of new superconducting materials like perovskite,
the substitution of silver for copper or the use of laser technologies instead
of diamond wire in polysilicon wafer cutting.
Fig. 1: Photovoltaic
module manufacturing plant.
However, technological changes like mentioned
cannot be the only explanation for such spectacular price falls, as all manufacturing
processes of high technology products have two inevitable components of
invariable nature establishing a floor under the unit costs, below which the
price cannot fall without putting project profitability at risk, regardless of the
place the product is manufactured. These components are:
- Investment earn back;
- Labour costs;
Investment earn back
All industrial projects require large
investments in machines and technology which have to be earned back in a
relatively short period of time: in high technology markets, which in
themselves are highly competitive, investment earn back time in general may not
exceed seven years. In some cases investment earn back can suppose up to 30% of
the costs per unit of product sold.
Labour costs
High technology industries are characterized by
highly automated manufacturing processes requiring highly skilled labour,
which, if it is already expensive in developed countries, in low labor costs
countries it is even more expensive because of its scarcity. Today’s China,
which over the years has become the most important industrial power in the
world, cannot be considered a low labor costs country anymore and hence cannot
base its competitiveness exclusively on low labour costs any more.
Sources of unfair competition
There
are still however two other components that do have considerable margin for
unit cost reductions. There are:
- Energy and other supplies;
- Raw materials;
Energy and other supplies
Energy represents an important share in unit
costs. It is widely known that China is responsible for around 30% of world CO2
emissions with a rising tendency (to compare: the USA 11% and the EU 7%, both
with a falling tendency, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0cde0e23-5057-11ee-9220-01aa75ed71a1/language-en). A big part of these emissions is
caused by China’s power grid, which consists for more than half of large coal
fired power plants. The coal is largely found in China itself, where it is
mined at extremely low costs. This way China assures itself of extremely cheap
electricity to drive its industry, something that would be impossible in
Europe.
Raw materials
In the industries that interest us in Europe,
raw materials represent the bulk of all costs. Its share usually moves between
50% and 80% of unit costs. Therefore, controlling raw material prices is the
key to be competitive.
Fig. 2: polysilicon production plant.
Other examples of abusive practices
China is not the only country, nor is the
auxiliary industry for renewable energy the only business suspected to deploy
labor exploitation to gain competitive advantages. Other blatant examples are
coltan mining in the Democratic Republico of the Congo, where women and
children are working very hard more than 12 hours a day at starvation wages to
dig the coveted mineral, without which our electronic devices will stop working
(https://www.eldebate.com/sociedad/20221124/coltan-preciado-mineral-tenemos-espana-no-explotamos_74894.html). However, it was not before the
beginning of the electric vehicle boom, which carry batteries that need
enormous quantities of coltan in order to work correctly, that child labour in
coltan mining took such disgusting proportions. 
Fig. 3: coltan mining in Africa.
The clothing industry is another notorious example
of labour exploitation, especially of women. It is mainly found in Asian
countries like China, Indonesia, Cambodia, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, as
well as Central American countries like Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador and
Honduras (https://www.oxfam.org/es/263000-mujeres-explotadas-en-las-maquilas-de-centroamerica). The cause is the market in
clothing importing countries, which is highly consumerist with frequently
changing preferences driven by the fashion business. The market therefore
demands low prices, which in turn leads
to the use of cheap synthetic fabrics which are hard to recycle and therefore
end up in enormous landfills for used clothes in Africa and South America,
causing severe environmental problems in these regions (https://www.eleconomista.net/actualidad/El-pais-que-se-convirtio-en-vertedero-de-ropa-usada-de-los-paises-ricos-20211015-0014.html).

Fig. 4: Used clothes landfill on a beach in Ghana (similar
landfills can be found in the Atacama Desert in Chile).
The social environmental certificate
Urgent need
Competing by destroying the environment or exploiting
groups of people in vulnerable situations is easy, but neither is it ethically,
nor economically justifiable: it keeps its victims in poverty, it increases the
environmental bill that once will have to be fully paid and it prevents any
form of balanced social and economic development from taking place, both in the
countries that export and the ones that import goods produced that way.
International trade is a good thing that creates
wealth for all nations, but the least one should demand from any imported good
is that it is produced with the same social and environmental standards we
apply to goods produced in our own Europe. The outstanding way of preventing any
socially or environmentally “contaminated” product from entering European
markets is demanding that any product sold in Europe, regardless of being
manufactured inside or outside Europe, gets a certificate that proves that it
meets certain social and environmental standards; this certificate could be
called the “European Social Environmental Certificated (ESEC)”.
Standards for each product
As each production process is different, one
should determine which social and environmental standards are appropriate for
each product and for each sector, applying them to the whole value chain of
that product.
In the particular case of photovoltaic modules
we have seen that energy supply and raw materials mining and processing are the
critical elements. In the case of batteries for electric vehicles it is coltan
mining, in the case of clothing manufacturing it is the manufacturing process
itself, while in the case of agricultural products the use of plant-protection
products forbidden in Europe for environmental and health reasons will
certainly be one of these elements.
Company
certificates
As one and the same company usually has a whole
catalogue of products, the ESEC could be issued to companies. The company that gets
such an ESEC will be able to demonstrate its products are produced according to
the social and environmental standards applicable to each product in its
catalogue.
Due diligence
Obviously all manufacturing companies in
producing countries (European countries included) will have to allow due
diligences done by experts designated by the European Union for that purpose.
Such due diligences will be done periodically without any previous notification
or after receiving complaints of non-compliance to which sufficient proof must
be added or in its absence, a thorough motivation, for being taken in
consideration.
Transitional
arrangements
Given the situation of absolute dependence on
imports from China in which we have moved ourselves into for the last 20 years,
we cannot do without them immediately applying the certificate. There must be a
transition period before the ESEC can be applied in full. During this period we
should build up sufficient manufacturing capacity to substitute maybe not all,
but yet a significant part of the imports from outside Europe.
Obviously unit costs in this transition period
will be higher than the price that is paid for the products imported and the
companies that manufacture them in Europe unavoidably will need financial
support in order to be minimally profitable.
Guaranteed
prices with correction mechanisms
Raising tariff walls against products imported
from certain countries is not going to work, as penalized countries can always
use third countries to redirect their exports. However, a method that does work
with proven efficiency is the guaranteed prices system. It was used in the
European Union (at that time called the European Community) from 1957 to 1992
for the whole of the agricultural sector (https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/cap-introduction/timeline-history/).
Achieving independency in food supply was the
great obsession in the European Community after the devastation suffered during
the second world war. It was decided that farmers would receive guaranteed
prices for their products to compensate higher production costs with respect to
non-European competitors. The success turned out to be complete: not only did
one achieve the desired independency in food supply, but also we ended up with
“butter mountains”, “milk pools” and “wine lakes” some decades later, i.e. unsustainable
surpluses of perishable goods which were impossible to sell.
The problem was not so much the guaranteed
prices system, but its implementation by not including corrective mechanisms,
like for example production caps or time limits; it was not until 1984 when a
systems of quota was introduced in an attempt to limit these excess supplies.
In 1992 the guaranteed prices system was abandoned. The error not to include
corrective mechanisms would be repeated again in Spain in the first decade of
this millennium with the unlimited feed-in tariffs scheme for new renewable
energy power plants (https://elperiodicodelaenergia.com/una-nueva-oportunidad-para-la-energia-solar-en-espana/).
Therefore, an eventual new system of guaranteed
prices for products that are eligible to receive an ESEC unavoidably must
contain the following corrective mechanisms if we do not wish to end up with
production surpluses or budget deficits again:
- An EU wide maximum on guaranteed production;
- A gradual decrease of the guaranteed price in line with foreseen cost saving technological progresses, if there are any;
- A maximum validity term, only extendible in case of extreme necessity.
The SDE+ system of guaranteed prices for power
generated by renewable energy installations used in the Netherlands (https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stimuleringsregeling_Duurzame_Energieproductie_en_Klimaattransitie) includes mentioned corrective
mechanisms; it has always performed satisfactorily in the sense of guaranteeing
effectively a certain price, but without generating production surpluses or
budgetary problems.
The guaranteed
prices system will be abolished when:
- A critical mass of production capacity has been achieved in Europe sufficient to substitute, if not all, then still at least a considerable part of the imports;
- The ESEC has been totally implemented for the products considered.
Once the ESEC is fully functional European
industry can compete on equal terms with manufacturers from third countries, as
these have to respect the environment and labour rights in a verifiable way. This
way their production costs sooner or later will approach European cost figures.
Also, European suppliers may gain reliability and offer a better after sales
service because of shorter supply chains compared to competitors abroad, which
is an undeniable competitive advantage which may compensate for eventually
slightly higher costs.
Obviously, trade wars can never be avoided
completely, but in general they are very short lived, as they tend to end up in
the bankruptcy of the party who started them. Nevertheless, given the current
conditions of commercial disadvantage artificially created by tolerating
violations of workers’ rights and pollution of the environment, the ESEC will
be an essential tool to recover our industrial Independence, maintain our
agricultural independence and gain our energy independence.
Sources
-https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en
-https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/repowereu-affordable-secure-and-sustainable-energy-europe_en
-https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/green-deal-industrial-plan_en
-https://investeu.europa.eu/index_en
-https://www.pvxchange.com/Price-Index
-https://rethinkresearch.biz/articles/rethink-energys-solar-module-price-forecast-to-2040/
-https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0cde0e23-5057-11ee-9220-01aa75ed71a1/language-en
-https://www.gem.wiki/China_and_coal
-https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polycrystalline_silicon
-https://elpais.com/planeta-futuro/2022-07-08/el-trabajo-forzado-de-los-uigures-arranca-un-nuevo-capitulo-en-la-guerra-comercial-entre-ee-uu-y-china.html
-https://www.ft.com/content/009d8434-9c12-48fd-8c93-d06d0b86779e
-https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-lost-trade-war-china-10-years-ago-has-it-learned-electric-vehicle-subsidies/
-https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2021/01/21/why-its-hard-for-congos-coltan-miners-to-abide-by-the-law
-https://www.eldebate.com/sociedad/20221124/coltan-preciado-mineral-tenemos-espana-no-explotamos_74894.html
-https://www.oxfam.org/es/263000-mujeres-explotadas-en-las-maquilas-de-centroamerica
-https://www.eleconomista.net/actualidad/El-pais-que-se-convirtio-en-vertedero-de-ropa-usada-de-los-paises-ricos-20211015-0014.html
-https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/cap-introduction/timeline-history/
-https://elperiodicodelaenergia.com/una-nueva-oportunidad-para-la-energia-solar-en-espana/
-https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stimuleringsregeling_Duurzame_Energieproductie_en_Klimaattransitie