Thursday, March 26, 2026

The Energy Transition, back to Common Sense

Global Warming as a Dogma of Faith

In 2022, the High Court of Justice of Extremadura forced Iberdrola to dismantle a solar photovoltaic (solar PV) plant and return the 500 hectares of land to its legitimate owner after it had been obtained through forced expropriation (https://www.eleconomista.es/energia/noticias/11820266/06/22/Una-sentencia-obliga-a-Iberdrola-a-desmantelar-la-planta-fotovoltaica-mas-grande-de-Europa-.html). In November of this year, the Regional Government of Andalusia began the forced expropriation of approximately 80 hectares of olive groves in several towns in the provinces of Córdoba and Jaén (Spain), despite opposition from owners and neighbours, to transfer them to a renewable energy development firm to build a solar PV plant (https://www.jaenhoy.es/jaen/inician-expropiacion-forzosa-100000-olivos-jaen-megaplantas-solares_0_2002746975.html). Development firm and regional government are utilizing a legal loophole in Article 54 of the Electricity Sector Law (Law 24/2013), which allows forced expropriation for "general interest" of land used for electrical installations. However, it is understood that land expropriated under this law, which dates back to a time before private developers even existed, should pass to public ownership; a Supreme Court ruling is currently awaited to confirm the law's original purpose.

These are just two examples of forced land expropriations for renewable energy facilities where public administrations use the excuse of a supposed general interest. Yet, this interest is relative, because the primary beneficiary is a private company using the installation for its own profit, and Spain has vast amounts of other available land. Ethics are notably absent when projects are developed without the owner's consent or knowledge and without offering a fair economic agreement.

In the Netherlands, a similar situation is occurring with wind energy, with advanced plans to turn the entire North Sea into a massive wind farm. This is deemed feasible due to year-round wind and shallow depths, despite the considerable ecological damage construction and operation of the plant will cause. Harmful effects are expected to be mitigated through further analysis (https://www.noordzee.nl/stichting-de-noordzee-presenteert-nieuw-rapport-over-internationale-ecologische-monitoring-van-windparken/), but there is no intention to halt deployment even if results are negative, as these installations are considered essential to curb global warming.


Figure 1: Wind farm in the North Sea.

These excesses are the result of an excessive fanaticism regarding the energy transition, stemming from a generalized fear of climate change or global warming, two terms often used interchangeably despite having different meanings. It was only a matter of time before a strong social and political opposition emerged, as seen in the Netherlands, where conditions for developing solar energy on agricultural land were tightened in 2023, effectively resulting in a ban. There is growing popular opposition to using agricultural land for anything else than farming or livestock breeding, which is reflected in recent election results where the "extreme right" is increasingly gaining support. These political parties across Europe share a skeptical attitude toward climate policies, including the energy transition.

It is discouraging to see how dogmatism has taken over the debate, with global warming as the only argument in favour or against. Supporters, who base their views on the IPCC climate report (https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/), regard CO2 reduction as fundamental, while opponents, united in the Clintel Foundation (https://clintel.org/world-climate-declaration/), argue that while the Earth may be warming, it cannot be proven it is caused by human activity, making the energy transition unnecessary or even counterproductive.

In this "debate among the deaf," three extremely relevant arguments are ignored that should carry more weight in public debate:
  1. The stabilization of energy prices.
  2. Energy independence.
  3. The reindustrialization of Europe.
These objectives are essential for maintaining freedom and prosperity in Europe in the current geopolitical turmoil.

The stabilization of energy prices

Unlike fossil fuels, which are subject to price fluctuations, renewable energies have a surprising ability to stabilize prices, once they can be stored! This was demonstrated in previous articles of mine regarding competitive renewable energy. For a latest reference see https://elperiodicodelaenergia.com/almacenamiento-salvando-el-sector-fotovoltaico (in Spanish). Renewable plants (solar PV, CSP, wind) have almost no variable costs because their "fuel" (sun or wind) is free. This fixed cost structure inevitably generates fixed final product prices.

However, storing renewable energy has been expensive and its application at large commercial scale has hardly begun. Consequently, renewable energy still has to be used as it is generated, which creates management problems, as the source usually is not available when it is most needed, causing grid issues and price collapses, like on April 28th 2025 in Spain and Portugal when (most likely) an excess of solar PV energy caused a general blackout that took more than 24 to restore (https://www.entsoe.eu/publications/blackout/28-april-2025-iberian-blackout/). These management problems stop once energy can be stored commercially. Solar or wind energy generated during low demand can be stored and sold when demand is high, stabilizing prices. Stable prices are a blessing for consumers and essential for industry if Europe wants to take its reindustrialization seriously.

Figure 2: Wind and solar PV farm with storage.

Energy Independence

The pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and recent Middle East tensions are showing cruelly Europe's dependence on third powers for essential goods and energy. We have not forgotten the high natural gas prices in 2022 due to sanctions against Russia, Europe’s main supplier (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?oldid=600472). Natural gas prices never fully recovered to pre-sanction levels.

These supply issues caused a German electricity price explosion nearly reaching 1,000 €/MWh on December 12th 2024, with mean prices around 300 €/MWh (https://www.energy-charts.info/?l=en&c=EU).

Such dependence is unacceptable; to stop relying on powers like Russia or the Gulf States, Europe must generate its own energy. While Europe lacks significant domestic fossil fuels beyond coal and some North Sea gas and oil, there are large thorium deposits in Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Greenland. In this landscape of scarcity, renewable generation becomes especially important.

The Reindustrialization of Europe

An energy transition supported by strong R&D can accelerate Europe's reindustrialization not only by generating our own energy but also inventing and manufacturing the necessary components. A photovoltaic module, for example, involves high-tech cells made from materials like copper, silver, and indium, assembled on polysilicon wafers cut with diamond wire or lasers. These wafers come from ingots produced in high-precision furnaces, a technological feat in itself, starting from silica sand through a sophisticated chemical process.


Figure 3: Modern solar PV cell manufacturing plant.

Wind turbines, transformers, electrolyzers, heliostats, and other renewable energy components have equally complex and technologically challenging value chains. For cost reasons, they are currently manufactured mostly outside of Europe. For them to be manufactured in Europe again, conditions similar to those existing in major manufacturing countries outside of Europe are needed.

Traditionally, this was achieved either by lowering production costs here, or by raising costs for our competitors there. The former is not possible for obvious reasons, so the European Commission is currently opting to raise costs for competitors through the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which imposes quotas on imported carbon-intensive products, while simultaneously requiring European industry to produce without CO2 emissions.

However, this mechanism focuses unilaterally on the hypothetical CO2 emissions in the production chain of imported products, even though CO2 is not the primary reason for the lower costs, not to mention unfair competition, in competing countries. What does explain the considerably lower costs in such countries is the disregard for the environment and labor rights. For Europe to be competitive and not overly dependent on imports, we must demand that supplier countries treat the environment and labor rights with at least the same respect as we do here in Europe. This could be achieved through the implementation of a so-called European Environmental and Social Certification, as I explain in detail in another article in Euro-Industria: https://euro-industria.blogspot.com/2024/01/towards-european-social-environmental.html.

Great Social and Political Consensus

Price stability, independence, and reindustrialization should be enough reasons for all parties across the political spectrum in any European country to be enthousiastically in favour of the energy transition. By stripping the transition of leftist dogmatism and right-wing rejection, a broad consensus based on rational criteria could be established. Moving away from climate dogmatism gains us two valuable things: time and our own fossil fuels.

Time

Research and Development

Without climate as the sole factor, there is no need to rush the transition by 2030 or 2050. Instead of desperately installing and spending billions of euros on solar and wind farms just to slightly lower temperatures, valuable resources can be dedicated to R&D and there is still much to explore.

Storage

In all the panic and haste, we forgot an essential element for renewable energies to perform their stabilizing role in energy markets: storage. With so much wind and solar power connected, we suddenly realized that power grids can no longer absorb even the slightest kilowatt-hour extra at times when it is least needed. Despite continous price falls storage remains expensive and requires large quantities of critical materials that Europe either lacks or cannot manufacture. The most notable examples are lithium (Chile, Bolivia, and Argentina) and coltan (Democratic Republic of Congo). Furthermore, lithium batteries are typically short-term storage batteries (24 hours), which are perfect for solar PV installations with their predictable daily production curves on the rhythm of the Sun, but do not address the challenge of storing energy for much longer periods, i.e., weeks or months.

Nevertheless, there are some promising technologies:



















Figure 4: Pumped hydro power plant (Muela de Cortes de Pallás, Spain); note the difference in height between the two reservoirs.

Increased Efficiency

The efficiency of photovoltaic cells, which are integrated into photovoltaic modules, also has considerable room for improvement. In current cells, efficiency ranges between 15% and 22%. With new manufacturing processes and the incorporation of new materials (perovskite), it could approach 40% or even 50% (https://www.pv-magazine.com/2024/12/24/perovskite-hjt-tandem-solar-cell-based-on-phosphonic-acid-self-assembled-monolayer-achieves-30-22-efficiency/). At the same time, its incorporation into various construction materials such as glass, stone (brick and tile) and even asphalt is being developed, so that in the future we may not need large ground mounted solar PV farms any more (https://www.solarmagazine.com/solar-panels/transparent-solar-panels/, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S221313882200981X).

Similar developments are underway in the wind energy industry (https://www.renewableenergymagazine.com/emily-newton/eight-amazing-nextgen-wind-turbines-designs--20230118). Traditional wind turbines are inefficient and environmentally unsatisfactory because they are very difficult to recycle. They also pose a risk to large flying birds and require large areas of land, often only available in ecologically valuable areas.

New Financing Mechanisms and Policies

The typical renewable energy project is financed primarily with debt through bank loans or issuing fixed-income securities. This financing model arose from the generous feed-in tariffs (FiT) granted in the past, which guaranteed a minimum price for the electricity generated. These FiTs have now been replaced almost everywhere by Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs). Since the FiT or PPA guaranteed the revenue of the renewable energy project, debt providers had no problem financing them. However, debt providers are necesarrily risk-averse and, for this reason, hinder the introduction of new technologies, such as newly designed, much more environmentally friendly wind turbines.

Price-based FiT policies encouraged expansion in quantity, but not in quality. If renewable energy promoting policies had been linked in part to technological progress instead of price only, we could have avoided many of the problems we are facing today. Storage, increased efficiency, environmental protection, and respect for communities and landowners must become the key elements in any future renewable energy promoting policies and regulations.

Own Fossil Energy Sources

Rejecting climate as a determining factor in the energy transition reopens the door to exploiting our own fossil fuels. Europe has quite a few of them which, though not sufficient, are by no means negligible: coal, natural gas, oil, and thorium for nuclear fission energy.

Coal

Coal is found mainly in the British Isles and Central Europe. Nobody with a minimum of common sense would want to reopen these dirty inefficient coal-fired power plants that used to leave their sticky, thin layer of soot on the monuments of Europe's ancient cities and in the lungs of their inhabitants and visitors. Thanks to coal gasification technology, it is now perfectly possible to generate electricity without emitting gases and pollutants, apart from carbon dioxide, which can never be considered a pollutant as it is essential for plant life. Lacking Russian gas, German industry, without which the European economy cannot exist, will once again have affordable electricity available from its own coal, thus enabling it to begin its much-needed recovery.

Natural Gas and Oil

Vast untapped natural gas reserves lie beneath the North Sea, enough to supply the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Northern Germany for the next 150 years. Significant oil deposits are also known to exist in the waters around Spain's Canary Islands. The legal prohibition (Law 7/2021 on Climate Change and Energy Transition) on even exploring these deposits for ecological reasons is absurd (https://www.libremercado.com/2022-03-19/asi-renuncio-espana-autosuficiencia-energetica-gas-petroleo-riqueza-minerales-criticos-colegio-geologos-6878142/), since their exploitation is definitely not incompatible with tourism if environmentally sustainable methods are used. Furthermore, it would represent an invaluable source of additional wealth if the local people of the Canary Islands were involved in its exploitation.

Nuclear Energy

In the same Law 7/2021, for the same ecological reasons it was decided to close existing Spanish nuclear power plants after they would have reached the end of their life cycle and to prohibit the construction of any new ones. This decision severely limits Spain's ability to have a stable electricity production in the short term, since, apart from the problem of radioactive waste, nuclear energy has only advantages: it is cheap, reliable, and does not emit polluting gases.

However, in the long term uranium-based nuclear energy should be discarded, since there are no significant deposits of this metal in Europe. The major uranium producers are all located outside of Europe, in the following order: Kazakhstan, Australia, Namibia, Canada, Uzbekistan, Niger, Russia, China, and Ukraine (https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-of-uranium/world-uranium-mining-production); the last three barely produce enough for their own energy supply.

Investing heavily in uranium fission nuclear energy would once again make us dependent on foreign powers, some of which are potentially opposed to European interests. France, which still generates most of its electricity with nuclear power, is already experiencing supply problems due to deteriorating relations with its former African colonies.

















Figure 5: Thorium demonstration power plant in China.

However, the vast thorium deposits in the far north of Europe and Greenland open the door to the medium-term deployment of nuclear energy using reactors fueled by this metal. Thorium reactors do not produce plutonium (fuel for nuclear weapons) and do not even leave a fraction of the radioactive waste produced by uranium reactors (https://web.archive.org/web/20101005073843/, http://www.geocities.com/rmoir2003/moir_teller.pdf), which also takes considerably less time to decay (300 years instead of tens of thousands of years, https://energyfromthorium.com/). The problem is that thorium technology still has a certain way to go in terms of development before it can become commercially viable. However, last year China has put the first demonstration reactor into operation in the Gobi Desert (https://www.financialexpress.com/business/defence-chinas-thorium-reactor-a-step-towards-a-clean-energy-future-but-what-about-india-3149998/).

Turbulent Times

The new US president, Donald Trump withdrew the US from the Paris Agreement on climate change and has resumed exploiting its abundant oil reserves. In the mean time Argentina has done the same. Meanwhile, in Europe, opposition to climate policies is growing as they are blamed for the explosive rise in energy and food prices, much more than the war in Ukraine or the recent turmoil in the Persian Gulf. The rise of the so-called far right to a resounding first place in the polls in Germany (it was already second with a narrow difference in the German parliament after the general elections held last year) perfectly reflects this opposition.

At the same time, France is now in a dangerous state of ungovernability that will force the President at any moment to call new parliamentary elections, in which case an absolute majority for the far right seems to be guaranteed. Finally, in Spain there is a socialist Prime Minister with the most precarious, unstable, and unpredictable parliamentary support in history. After hypothetical snap general elections, in which the current left-wing coalition will most likely be defeated, a coalition that includes Spain's far right seems the only way to form a government.

Should these predictions come true, without any shade of doubt climate policies will be consigned to the proverbial dunghill of history and also will energy transition, exactly because it has been linked too much by mainstream politics to the fight against global warming only. We have seen already how beneficial a patiently and intelligently implemented energy transition can be for Europe. Moreover, the energy transition is essential to preserving, or if necessary, regaining our independence and prosperity. It would be catastrophic for Europe if, along with climate policies, the energy transition too were thrown overboard.

Thursday, January 18, 2024

Towards a European social environmental certificate for imported goods

Extreme vulnerability in Europe

Already on 11 December 2019 the European Commission presented The European Green Deal, an ambitious programme to turn Europe in 2050 into the first completely climatological neutral continent in the world, with an important focus on energy independence and reindustrialization (https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en).

Very soon after three events would rocket the whole world causing social, political and financial turmoil of biblical proportions: the covid pandemic, the war in Ukraine and recently the Israeli invasion in Gaza. The first mentioned would disrupt, though only temporarily, the supply chain for industrial goods from China. The second one would cut off permanently the supply of natural gas from Russia. Natural gas is an essential fuel for Europe without which their economies may come to a complete stand still. The last one in the series may cause severe problems with the supply of crude oil if the countries on the Persian Gulf get involved in the conflict. Also the supply of industrial goods from China may get disrupted again if finally ship transit through the Red Sea is blocked.

In the light of these events it is logical that the European Commission decided to accelerate and intensify the European Green Deal. In May 2022 REPowerEU (https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/repowereu-affordable-secure-and-sustainable-energy-europe_en) was launched, a plan provided with funding to save energy,  generate renewable energy and diversify the sources of our energy. In February 2023 the Green Deal Industrial Plan was launched (https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/green-deal-industrial-plan_en), also well provided with European funding (InvestEU, https://investeu.europa.eu/index_en), with the purpose to reindustrialize the whole of Europe, focusing on key industries to achieve complete energy independence as well as climatological neutrality.

Perspectives  for new industrial projects

It is not a surprise that the diligence displayed by the European Commission has motivated many investors and business people to initiate industrial projects to be carried out in Europe, especially related to the energy transition: solar photovoltaic cells and modules, batteries of all types, electrolizers for hydrogen production, polysilicon wafers for microchips, solar cells, electromagnetic components and a lot more. To limit myself to my core business, which is the development of solar energy projects, as an economist I can confirm that each and every project developed and launched thus far could be perfectly profitable if the prices paid for energy and industrial goods stayed at the levels of 2022 when the solar photovoltaic module price increased to 0.40 €/Wp, after a long period of constant decreases until 2020 when it fell to only 0.17 €/Wp (https://www.pvxchange.com/Price-Index).

However, in 2023 the photovoltaic module price initiated a spectacular fall again to hardly 0.15 €/Wp, basically due to two factors: the measures taken in the United States against industrial products from China, accused of dumping, and the overproduction in that country causing an excess supply in Europe.

There is now an increasing number of analyses and studies that forecast even more spectacular photovoltaic module price falls as from now, leaving it at no more than 0.09 €/Wp in 2030 (https://rethinkresearch.biz/articles/rethink-energys-solar-module-price-forecast-to-2040/). I must admit however that the technological progress expected especially in manufacturing processes for sure will contribute to mentioned price falls. Such technological progress includes, but is not limited to the application of hetero instead of homo junction in photovoltaic cell manufacturing (nothing to do with couple formation between human beings), the application of new superconducting materials like perovskite, the substitution of silver for copper or the use of laser technologies instead of diamond wire in polysilicon wafer cutting.

Fig. 1: Photovoltaic module manufacturing plant.

However, technological changes like mentioned cannot be the only explanation for such spectacular price falls, as all manufacturing processes of high technology products have two inevitable components of invariable nature establishing a floor under the unit costs, below which the price cannot fall without putting project profitability at risk, regardless of the place the product is manufactured. These components are:

  • Investment earn back;
  • Labour costs;
Investment earn back

All industrial projects require large investments in machines and technology which have to be earned back in a relatively short period of time: in high technology markets, which in themselves are highly competitive, investment earn back time in general may not exceed seven years. In some cases investment earn back can suppose up to 30% of the costs per unit of product sold.

Labour costs

High technology industries are characterized by highly automated manufacturing processes requiring highly skilled labour, which, if it is already expensive in developed countries, in low labor costs countries it is even more expensive because of its scarcity. Today’s China, which over the years has become the most important industrial power in the world, cannot be considered a low labor costs country anymore and hence cannot base its competitiveness exclusively on low labour costs any more.

Sources of unfair competition

There are still however two other components that do have considerable margin for unit cost reductions. There are:
  • Energy and other supplies;
  • Raw materials;
Energy and other supplies

Energy represents an important share in unit costs. It is widely known that China is responsible for around 30% of world CO2 emissions with a rising tendency (to compare: the USA 11% and the EU 7%, both with a falling tendency, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0cde0e23-5057-11ee-9220-01aa75ed71a1/language-en). A big part of these emissions is caused by China’s power grid, which consists for more than half of large coal fired power plants. The coal is largely found in China itself, where it is mined at extremely low costs. This way China assures itself of extremely cheap electricity to drive its industry, something that would be impossible in Europe.

Raw materials

In the industries that interest us in Europe, raw materials represent the bulk of all costs. Its share usually moves between 50% and 80% of unit costs. Therefore, controlling raw material prices is the key to be competitive.

The outstanding raw material in photovoltaic module manufacturing is polysilicon, which requires enormous quantities of energy, which, as we have seen, in China is very cheap. Besides, the mining and processing of the raw material for polysilicon, industrial grade silicon (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polycrystalline_silicon), is concentrated in the Chinese region of Xinjiang (East Turkistan or Uyghurstan) where there is a justified suspicion of merciless labour exploitation of the native population in certain industries, polysilicon manufacturing being one of them (https://elpais.com/planeta-futuro/2022-07-08/el-trabajo-forzado-de-los-uigures-arranca-un-nuevo-capitulo-en-la-guerra-comercial-entre-ee-uu-y-china.htmlhttps://www.ft.com/content/009d8434-9c12-48fd-8c93-d06d0b86779e). This way China achieves in a highly unethical way certain competitive advantages which in Europe for obvious reasons would be impossible to get.

Fig. 2: polysilicon production plant.

Finally, one should not exclude the possibility Chinese companies have to sell below unit cost price to achieve the prices foreseen in the future, which would suggest an unambiguous readiness to start a long lasting trade conflict with the European Union, apparently to stifle any attempt to reindustrialize our own continent (https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-lost-trade-war-china-10-years-ago-has-it-learned-electric-vehicle-subsidies/).

Other examples of abusive practices

China is not the only country, nor is the auxiliary industry for renewable energy the only business suspected to deploy labor exploitation to gain competitive advantages. Other blatant examples are coltan mining in the Democratic Republico of the Congo, where women and children are working very hard more than 12 hours a day at starvation wages to dig the coveted mineral, without which our electronic devices will stop working (https://www.eldebate.com/sociedad/20221124/coltan-preciado-mineral-tenemos-espana-no-explotamos_74894.html). However, it was not before the beginning of the electric vehicle boom, which carry batteries that need enormous quantities of coltan in order to work correctly, that child labour in coltan mining took such disgusting proportions.


























Fig. 3: coltan mining in Africa.

The clothing industry is another notorious example of labour exploitation, especially of women. It is mainly found in Asian countries like China, Indonesia, Cambodia, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, as well as Central American countries like Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras (https://www.oxfam.org/es/263000-mujeres-explotadas-en-las-maquilas-de-centroamerica). The cause is the market in clothing importing countries, which is highly consumerist with frequently changing preferences driven by the fashion business. The market therefore demands  low prices, which in turn leads to the use of cheap synthetic fabrics which are hard to recycle and therefore end up in enormous landfills for used clothes in Africa and South America, causing severe environmental problems in these regions (https://www.eleconomista.net/actualidad/El-pais-que-se-convirtio-en-vertedero-de-ropa-usada-de-los-paises-ricos-20211015-0014.html).

Fig. 4: Used clothes landfill on a beach in Ghana (similar landfills can be found in the Atacama Desert in Chile).

The social environmental certificate

Urgent need

Competing by destroying the environment or exploiting groups of people in vulnerable situations is easy, but neither is it ethically, nor economically justifiable: it keeps its victims in poverty, it increases the environmental bill that once will have to be fully paid and it prevents any form of balanced social and economic development from taking place, both in the countries that export and the ones that import goods produced that way.

International trade is a good thing that creates wealth for all nations, but the least one should demand from any imported good is that it is produced with the same social and environmental standards we apply to goods produced in our own Europe. The outstanding way of preventing any socially or environmentally “contaminated” product from entering European markets is demanding that any product sold in Europe, regardless of being manufactured inside or outside Europe, gets a certificate that proves that it meets certain social and environmental standards; this certificate could be called the “European Social Environmental Certificated (ESEC)”.

Standards for each product

As each production process is different, one should determine which social and environmental standards are appropriate for each product and for each sector, applying them to the whole value chain of that product.

In the particular case of photovoltaic modules we have seen that energy supply and raw materials mining and processing are the critical elements. In the case of batteries for electric vehicles it is coltan mining, in the case of clothing manufacturing it is the manufacturing process itself, while in the case of agricultural products the use of plant-protection products forbidden in Europe for environmental and health reasons will certainly be one of these elements.

Company certificates

As one and the same company usually has a whole catalogue of products, the ESEC could be issued to companies. The company that gets such an ESEC will be able to demonstrate its products are produced according to the social and environmental standards applicable to each product in its catalogue.

Due diligence

Obviously all manufacturing companies in producing countries (European countries included) will have to allow due diligences done by experts designated by the European Union for that purpose. Such due diligences will be done periodically without any previous notification or after receiving complaints of non-compliance to which sufficient proof must be added or in its absence, a thorough motivation, for being taken in consideration.

Transitional arrangements

Given the situation of absolute dependence on imports from China in which we have moved ourselves into for the last 20 years, we cannot do without them immediately applying the certificate. There must be a transition period before the ESEC can be applied in full. During this period we should build up sufficient manufacturing capacity to substitute maybe not all, but yet a significant part of the imports from outside Europe.

Obviously unit costs in this transition period will be higher than the price that is paid for the products imported and the companies that manufacture them in Europe unavoidably will need financial support in order to be minimally profitable.

Guaranteed prices with correction mechanisms

Raising tariff walls against products imported from certain countries is not going to work, as penalized countries can always use third countries to redirect their exports. However, a method that does work with proven efficiency is the guaranteed prices system. It was used in the European Union (at that time called the European Community) from 1957 to 1992 for the whole of the agricultural sector (https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/cap-introduction/timeline-history/).

Achieving independency in food supply was the great obsession in the European Community after the devastation suffered during the second world war. It was decided that farmers would receive guaranteed prices for their products to compensate higher production costs with respect to non-European competitors. The success turned out to be complete: not only did one achieve the desired independency in food supply, but also we ended up with “butter mountains”, “milk pools” and “wine lakes” some decades later, i.e. unsustainable surpluses of perishable goods which were impossible to sell.

The problem was not so much the guaranteed prices system, but its implementation by not including corrective mechanisms, like for example production caps or time limits; it was not until 1984 when a systems of quota was introduced in an attempt to limit these excess supplies. In 1992 the guaranteed prices system was abandoned. The error not to include corrective mechanisms would be repeated again in Spain in the first decade of this millennium with the unlimited feed-in tariffs scheme for new renewable energy power plants (https://elperiodicodelaenergia.com/una-nueva-oportunidad-para-la-energia-solar-en-espana/).

Therefore, an eventual new system of guaranteed prices for products that are eligible to receive an ESEC unavoidably must contain the following corrective mechanisms if we do not wish to end up with production surpluses or budget deficits again:

  1. An EU wide maximum on guaranteed production;
  2. A gradual decrease of the guaranteed price in line with foreseen cost saving technological progresses, if there are any;
  3. A maximum validity term, only extendible in case of extreme necessity.

The SDE+ system of guaranteed prices for power generated by renewable energy installations used in the Netherlands (https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stimuleringsregeling_Duurzame_Energieproductie_en_Klimaattransitie) includes mentioned corrective mechanisms; it has always performed satisfactorily in the sense of guaranteeing effectively a certain price, but without generating production surpluses or budgetary problems.

The guaranteed prices system will be abolished when:

  1. A critical mass of production capacity has been achieved in Europe sufficient to substitute, if not all, then still at least a considerable part of the imports;
  2. The ESEC has been totally implemented for the products considered.

Once the ESEC is fully functional European industry can compete on equal terms with manufacturers from third countries, as these have to respect the environment and labour rights in a verifiable way. This way their production costs sooner or later will approach European cost figures. Also, European suppliers may gain reliability and offer a better after sales service because of shorter supply chains compared to competitors abroad, which is an undeniable competitive advantage which may compensate for eventually slightly higher costs.

Obviously, trade wars can never be avoided completely, but in general they are very short lived, as they tend to end up in the bankruptcy of the party who started them. Nevertheless, given the current conditions of commercial disadvantage artificially created by tolerating violations of workers’ rights and pollution of the environment, the ESEC will be an essential tool to recover our industrial Independence, maintain our agricultural independence and gain our energy independence.

Sources

-https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en

-https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/repowereu-affordable-secure-and-sustainable-energy-europe_en

-https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/green-deal-industrial-plan_en

-https://investeu.europa.eu/index_en

-https://www.pvxchange.com/Price-Index

-https://rethinkresearch.biz/articles/rethink-energys-solar-module-price-forecast-to-2040/

-https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0cde0e23-5057-11ee-9220-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

-https://www.gem.wiki/China_and_coal

-https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polycrystalline_silicon

-https://elpais.com/planeta-futuro/2022-07-08/el-trabajo-forzado-de-los-uigures-arranca-un-nuevo-capitulo-en-la-guerra-comercial-entre-ee-uu-y-china.html

-https://www.ft.com/content/009d8434-9c12-48fd-8c93-d06d0b86779e

-https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-lost-trade-war-china-10-years-ago-has-it-learned-electric-vehicle-subsidies/

-https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2021/01/21/why-its-hard-for-congos-coltan-miners-to-abide-by-the-law

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-https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stimuleringsregeling_Duurzame_Energieproductie_en_Klimaattransitie